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Abstract: To address the rise in non-communicable diseases (NCDs), 
governments are now being urged to ‘put forward a multisectoral approach 
for health at all government levels, to address NCD risk factors and 
underlying determinants of health comprehensively and decisively’ [UN, 2011. 
Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (No. A/66/L.1). New 
York, NY: United Nations]. There is a global consensus that whole-of-
government approaches (WG) can be particularly effective in regulating 
products such as tobacco, pre-packaged foods and alcohol, which are or can 
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be major risk factors for NCDs. Despite the overwhelming push towards 
interagency arrangements for health policymaking and implementation, 
including in contemporary efforts to prevent and control NCDs, there has 
been minimal investigation into how countries have pursued WG and which 
types of institutional designs and arrangements offer particular utility to 
achieve health objectives. This article examines these issues through a case 
study concerning the interagency mechanism that the Philippine government 
currently utilizes to govern tobacco control, the Interagency Committee—
Tobacco (IAC-T). We conducted key informant interviews (n = 33) with 
government officials, and representatives from civil society organizations, 
health professional associations and intergovernmental organizations. We 
targeted informants who have been involved in the work of the IAC-T and/or 
tobacco control policy more broadly. We also analysed public documents to 
contribute to our analysis of the structure, functioning and legal status of the 
IAC-T. Our findings highlight two salient challenges that arose in the 
Philippines case: (1) the inclusion of industry representation on the IAC-T and 
(2) the attempt to consolidate the responsibilities of the different departments 
through a policy of ‘balance’ between health and commercial interests. We 
analyse how health proponents navigated this challenging institutional 
arrangement and the various barriers they faced in achieving the intended 
health objectives. We draw from this case to discuss the lessons that can 
inform broad calls for WG to NCDs.  
Keywords: Whole-of-government, intersectoral collaboration, tobacco 
control, health policy, non-communicable diseases, Health in All Policies 
Key Messages 
 Whole-of-government approaches to non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) hold promise for policy coherence across sectors. 
 The whole-of-government approach to tobacco control in the 
Philippines demonstrates that not all such approaches best serve 
health objectives.  
 This article points to the importance of not only structural features of 
whole-of-government approaches for NCD control but also the 
institutional culture and entrenched political and economic interests.  
Introduction 
The most recent evidence from the Global Burden of Disease 
Study indicates that the number of deaths from communicable 
diseases in 2010 has decreased by approximately 10% since 1990, 
whereas the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) has 
increased markedly, now accounting for two of every three deaths 
worldwide and 54% of disability-adjusted life years (up from 43% in 
1990) (Lozano et al. 2012; Murray et al. 2012). To address this 
increase in NCDs, governments are encouraging each other to ‘put 
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forward a multisectoral approach for health at all government levels, 
to address NCD risk factors and underlying determinants of health 
comprehensively and decisively’ (UN 2011). There is a global 
consensus that whole-of-government approaches (WG) can be 
particularly effective in regulating products such as tobacco, pre-
packaged foods and alcohol, which are or can be major risk factors for 
NCDs (Beaglehole et al. 2011). This emphasis on WG began with calls 
for intersectoral action in the Declaration of Alma Ata, then as healthy 
public policy in the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (WHO 1986; 
Nutbeam 1994), and most recently in the discourse on Health in All 
Policies (HiAP) (Kickbusch et al. 2008). Proponents suggest that the 
objective of HiAP can be realized through a ‘collaborative approach to 
improving the health of all people by incorporating health 
considerations into decision-making across sectors and policy areas’ 
(Rudolph et al. 2013). The HiAP discourse explicitly incorporates the 
language used by proponents of WG such as ‘joined-up-government’ 
(Kickbusch et al. 2008; Kickbusch 2010). In other words, WG is 
recognized as a vehicle to achieve the health objectives of HiAP.  
Early proponents of the WG to governance observed that many, 
if not all, government departments largely functioned along discrete 
lines with minimal collaboration or co-operation across sectors that 
lead to government inefficiencies and internal conflicts. These early 
proponents viewed the WG as a means of moving public policy out of 
ministerial silos with the ultimate goal of establishing and 
implementing coherent policy across sectors (Christensen and Lægreid 
2007). Other purported benefits include cost sharing (i.e. pooling of 
resources) (Vangen and Huxham 2003; Lundin 2007), enhanced policy 
coherence (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; De Alba 2012) and 
accountability across sectors (Wilkins 2002). Health policy proponents 
of WG have advocated for the insertion of health into the portfolios of 
agriculture, finance, labour, foreign affairs and other sectors (Vega 
2004; Marmot et al. 2008; WHO 2009; Kickbusch 2010). The central 
rationale provided in the health policy literature in favour of WG is that 
many health problems require crosscutting solutions (Sacks et al. 
2009). WG are seen to facilitate the realization of health objectives by 
creating public policy that systematically incorporates health objectives 
across government sectors. For example, it is known that tobacco 
control, with the ultimate goal of decreased tobacco consumption, 
requires co-ordination across sectors such as finance (e.g. taxation 
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strategies), agriculture (e.g. crop substitution programmes), and 
health (e.g. tobacco cessation programmes). WG are not without 
challenges. Some studies have found that conflicting objectives among 
different sectors can lead to stalemate or fragmentation in decision-
making (Exworthy and Powell 2004), resource inefficiencies or loss of 
departmental autonomy (Vincent 1999; Exworthy and Powell 2004; 
Coulson 2005). The principal question that needs to be asked is how 
can WG best meet the intended health objectives?  
Before we discuss our research into the case of the Philippine 
Interagency Committee—Tobacco (IAC-T), it is important to clarify 
what we mean by interagency arrangement in order to facilitate future 
comparative work across countries, institutional designs and 
processes. We use the term interagency arrangement to mean formal 
(i.e. politically mandated) relationships between more than two sectors 
(i.e. a section of government that deals exclusively with a particular 
issue such as health, justice or agriculture). An interagency 
arrangement is one type of WG. Many partnerships in the health sector 
involve voluntary arrangements that address a particular 
administrative issue or enhance access to products or services (Buse 
and Walt 2000a,b; Buse and Waxman 2001). Interagency 
arrangements are often established when a particular goal is thought 
to be best achieved through co-operation (instrumental value) or when 
actors have a commitment to inclusive governance or question the 
legitimacy of top-down decision-making (intrinsic value) (Lasker et al. 
2001; Coulson 2005; Ansell and Gash 2008). Governments have 
begun to mandate interagency arrangements to address NCDs, 
specifically in the area of tobacco control. For example, the tobacco 
control legislation in Kenya establishes the Tobacco Control Board that 
advises on the implementation of the Tobacco Control Act of 2007 
(Tobacco Control Act 2007, 2007). Brazil has a similar interagency 
arrangement (CONICQ) but with a broad mandate to strengthen 
tobacco control in the country and implement the provisions of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (Lee et al. 2010).  
In some contrast, such arrangements have yet to be 
systematically instituted by governments in the areas of food and 
alcohol governance. The cases of WG to tobacco control can provide 
important lessons for food and alcohol governance; particularly given 
that each area involves a commercial entity whose products are 
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associated risk factors for NCDs. It has been argued that prepackaged 
food and alcohol pose less risk to human health than tobacco, yet 
scholars have begun to make the case that the differences among the 
three are outweighed by their similarity (Brownell and Warner 2009; 
Moodie et al. 2013). The most important similarity between the three 
products, one that allows for lessons from the regulation of one 
product to be applied to the others, is that all three industries actively 
seek no or minimal regulation of their products (Brownell and Warner 
2009; Moodie et al. 2013). The food industry, such as the tobacco 
industry, is known to heavily lobby government to prevent the 
regulation of their products (Brownell and Warner 2009; Cappuccio et 
al. 2013). Arguably, WG to food and alcohol regulation are even more 
vulnerable to industry co-option given that, particularly for food, the 
two industries have been successful in framing the linkage between 
their products and NCDs as an issue of consumer choice rather than an 
issue inherent to the product itself. For example, the food industry 
asserts that there is no ‘bad’ food but rather bad individual choices 
(Koplan and Brownell 2010). The success of this type of rhetoric is 
reflected in the willingness of norm-setting organizations such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and governments to partner with 
the food industry in health education and promotion campaigns 
(Koplan and Brownell 2010; Stuckler and Nestle 2012). The norms 
pertaining to tobacco and the tobacco industry are markedly different 
where many governments and prominent intergovernmental 
organizations such as the WHO and the World Bank explicitly prohibit 
partnerships with the tobacco industry. In other words, governments 
do not have the same social sensitivity or institutional policies against 
partnering with the food industry as they do with the tobacco industry. 
Given this complex policy space there is a pressing need to examine 
how countries have pursued WG and which types of institutional 
arrangements offer particular utility for achieving health objectives 
(Kickbusch 2010). Our research examines these issues through a case 
study of the IAC-T, the interagency mechanism instituted by the 
Philippine government to govern tobacco control. The Tobacco 
Regulation Act (hereafter RA 9211) is the principal Act governing 
tobacco in the Philippines and establishes the IAC-T to implement the 
provisions of the Act (Tobacco Regulation Act 2003).  
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Methods 
We chose this salient case because the Philippines was one of 
the first countries to mandate an interagency arrangement for tobacco 
control. We explore this institutional arrangement using different data 
sources. Our investigation includes interviews with key informants (n 
= 33) from different sectors of government, civil society, the tobacco 
industry and the tobacco-growing sector (see Table 1). Key informants 
were chosen because of their involvement in tobacco control in the 
Philippines, and more specifically their involvement with the IAC-T. We 
included informants who served on the IAC-T as well as individuals 
who had contact with members of the IAC-T in their work on tobacco 
issues. We also used a snowball sampling technique wherein the 
informants that we initially identified were asked to suggest other 
individuals who they thought could contribute to our understanding of 
the structure and functioning of the IAC-T. All informants were asked 
whether their institutional affiliation could be included in the 
presentation of the findings. Documents were also included for 
analysis, which included government legislation, policy and technical 
briefs, and domestic legal disputes involving the IAC-T. We transcribed 
the interviews verbatim. The transcripts were entered into NVivo 
qualitative software and were analysed along with the documentary 
sources using open coding. We used the open coding technique to 
facilitate inductive analysis. The authors obtained ethical approval 
from their institute.  
Table 1. List of key informants by affiliation 
Number of participants Government 
2 Department of Finance 
6 Department of Trade and Industry 
2 Department of Agriculture 
5 Department of Health 
1 Department of Foreign Affairs 
1 National Tobacco Administration 
2 Legislature 
 Civil society 
4 Health NGOs 
2 Medical Association 
1 Trade Union 
3 Tobacco Industry 
 Intergovernmental organizations 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Health Policy and Planning, Vol 30, No. 7 (September 2015): pg. 844-852. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Oxford University Press. 
7 
 
Number of participants Government 
2 World Bank 
2 World Trade Organization 
Results 
As mentioned above, the IAC-T is responsible for implementing 
and enforcing the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211). Our 
findings focus on both RA 9211 and the IAC-T as we demonstrate that 
the Act and the mandated interagency arrangement are reinforcing. It 
is specified in RA 9211 that the secretary of the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) is to serve as chair of the IAC-T and the secretary 
of the Department of Health (DOH) is to serve as vice-chair. Six other 
departments are represented on the committee along with a 
‘representative from the Tobacco industry to be nominated by the 
legitimate and recognized associations of the industry’ (Tobacco 
Regulation Act 2003) and one representative from civil society 
nominated by the DOH. Inclusion of an industry representative on the 
IAC-T seemed to play an important role in preempting FCTC Article 
5.3, which requires Parties to act to protect public health policies with 
respect to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests 
of the tobacco industry. Our findings suggest that the timing of RA 
9211, with the formal inclusion of a tobacco industry representative on 
the IAC-T, prior to the Philippines ratifying the FCTC, has pre-empted 
the movement towards FCTC compliant legislation.  
RA 9211, the IAC-T and FCTC pre-emption 
The Philippines Congress adopted the Act in 2003, 2 years 
before the country ratified the FCTC, but only a few months after 
adoption of the Convention by the World Health Assembly. As such, RA 
9211 does not purport to incorporate the FCTC into domestic law. One 
director-level key informant from the World Bank based in the 
Philippines noted that there is still much confusion in government and 
civil society on the legal authority of the FCTC. The Philippines is a 
dualist legal system meaning that ‘the constitution of the state accords 
no special status to treaties; the rights and obligations created by 
them have no effect in domestic law unless legislation is in force to 
give effect to them (original emphasis)’ (Aust 2007). The fact that the 
Philippines must pass legislation to enact the provisions of the FCTC 
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into domestic law heightens the importance of RA 9211 as a pre-
emptive measure. The timing of the legislation appears to have served 
the protection of industry interests, ensuring that the industry has a 
seat on the only mandated tobacco control body in the country (IAC-
T)—an arrangement that would be unlikely post-FCTC—and the 
correspondingly weak tobacco control measures introduced in RA 9211 
(i.e. mostly weaker than those required by the FCTC). An additional 
nuance to the timing of RA 9211 is that industry interests are better 
positioned to dissuade the establishment of an FCTC-compliant 
legislation. Our findings point out that these two elements (i.e. 
industry inclusion and weak legislation) are reinforcing, whereby the 
composition of the IAC-T makes enforcement of RA 9211 difficult by 
taking away power from the DOH, whereas the Act itself makes it 
difficult for the DOH to move towards FCTC-compliant measures.  
Key informants from DTI confirmed the central role of RA 9211 
in Philippine tobacco control stating that ‘policy on cigarettes and 
tobacco comes from RA 9211’, and that it ‘is the policy and law with 
respect to tobacco and cigarettes that we follow’. This perspective was 
enshrined in a decision given by the Court of Appeals in a recent case 
between Philip Morris Philippines (PMPMI) and the DOH (Philip Morris 
Philippines Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.). 
PMPMI petitioned the court to compel the DOH and the Bureau of Food 
and Drugs (now the Food and Drug Administration) to grant them the 
ability to carry out promotional activities, which they argued was 
lawful according to RA 9211. The DOH had summarily denied PMPMI’s 
application for permission to engage in promotional activities 
independently of the IAC-T and indicated to PMPMI that tobacco 
companies were no longer permitted to do so according to RA 9211, 
but more importantly the DOH used the provisions of the FCTC to 
justify their decision. In other words, the DOH used not only the 
domestic legislation (which permits promotional activity) but also the 
provisions of the FCTC (which discourages promotional activity). The 
Court of Appeals decided in favour of PMPMI’s petition and stated that:  
“The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is not 
self-executing and cannot be the direct legal basis for the 
respondents to justify its mistaken stance that Tobacco 
Promotions are now fully prohibited … it provides only for the 
gradual elimination of tobacco due to health concerns and 
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takes into account the “legal environment and technical 
means available” to the signatory-Country. Until such time 
when there is already a new law totally eliminating all forms of 
tobacco use and tobacco-related activities, this Court has not 
other recourse but to act only in accordance with the prevailing 
R.A. No. 9211.” [No emphasis added] (Philip Morris Philippines 
Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.)  
The findings from our interviews indicate that the Philippines Tobacco 
Institute (PTI), an industry interest group, and/or its key members 
also advance the authority of RA 9211 in the public discourse on the 
relationship between the Act and the FCTC, further supporting the 
argument that the Act indeed has served to preempt stricter tobacco 
control measures from the FCTC and has served to situate power and 
control within the IAC-T rather than with the health sector specifically. 
In another legal case in 2011, the PTI sought to set aside the 
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of the Food and Drug 
Administration Act of 2009, arguing that they did not apply to tobacco 
products because the IRR went beyond RA 9211. The PTI specifically 
argued that:  
“the IRR of R.A. No. 9711 which placed tobacco products within 
the regulatory powers of the Food and Drug Administration was 
issued by the respondents in disregard of the provisions of 
Republic Act No. 9211 otherwise known as the ‘Tobacco 
Regulation Act of 2003’ which bestows the exclusive authority to 
regulate tobacco products upon the Interagency Tobacco-
Committee, where petitioner is also a member.” (Philippine 
Tobacco Institute v. The Department of Health 2011)  
The court decided against PTI in this case stating that they did not 
provide sufficient evidence of definite or immediate harm to the 
petitioner. It is important to note that the ruling was issued because 
the ‘allegations (by PTI) fail to establish an actual existing right on the 
part of the petitioner (PTI) that was violated’, not because the court 
decided on the relationship between the IRR and RA 9211 (i.e. the 
authority of the IAC-T) (Philippine Tobacco Institute v. The 
Department of Health 2011). Also, the PTI explicitly used their 
membership on the IAC-T in their argumentation, which suggests that 
industry interests support the IAC-T. The industry has not argued 
against the IAC-T like it has other perceived shifts of authority to 
health-oriented government departments and agencies. One would 
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expect the industry to vehemently oppose the IAC-T if the industry 
thought that their interests were threatened by its authority and 
functioning, as indicated by these two cases.  
The challenge of incrementalism 
There was and continues to be tension about whether some 
tobacco control legislation is better than none (an incrementalist 
approach) among tobacco control proponents in the Philippines. Some 
tobacco control proponents in the Philippines, a minority, argue that 
certain perceived improvements in tobacco control legislation might 
actually hinder the movement towards strong future tobacco control 
legislation. Beginning in the drafting stages of RA 9211 there were 
conflicting perspectives on the utility of the Act, specifically because of 
the composition of the IAC-T. Prior to the adoption of RA 9211, a high-
ranking government official in the DOH, with experience in tobacco 
control, including with the FCTC, commented that the draft Act should 
be ‘vetoed because congress made the Department of Trade the chair 
of the overall committee instead of the Department of Health … 
(which) was a signal to me that this was obviously … geared towards 
trade, and health was an afterthought’. In contrast, a prominent 
tobacco control advocate from civil society had urged this official to 
support the Act, noting, ‘no matter how imperfect it is I think we can 
start with something rather than have nothing at all’. The merit of an 
incremental approach to tobacco control legislation was echoed in all 
of the interviews with tobacco control advocates from civil society. Our 
findings suggest that, apart from the possible benefits of having some 
tobacco control legislation, the IAC-T is a persistent challenge to 
tobacco control efforts.  
‘Balancing’ private interests and health 
The first paragraph of RA 9211 states:  
“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from 
hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill 
health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the 
State … to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the 
interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco 
industry. For these purposes, the government shall institute a 
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balanced policy whereby … tobacco products shall be 
regulated in order to promote a healthful environment … and at 
the same time ensure that the interest of tobacco farmers, 
growers, workers and stakeholders are not adversely 
compromised.” (emphasis added) (Tobacco Regulation Act 
2003)  
This explicit statement for the need to balance health and 
economic aspects of tobacco and tobacco control has served to reify 
the perspective that health is only one consideration in Philippine 
tobacco control policy. Interviewees from public health agencies and 
organizations consistently raised concerns that the emphasis within 
the IAC-T has typically focused on business aspects of tobacco 
regulation. Participants from DTI emphasized unprompted that RA 
9211 represents a ‘balance’ between health and stakeholders from the 
tobacco sector. The fact that the DTI chairs the IAC-T in the 
Philippines is unusual given that tobacco control is a health issue and 
not an economic issue. The composition and structure of the IAC-T 
provides evidence that structure matters for WG to health policy, while 
also demonstrating that an entrenched institutional culture that 
attempts to ‘balance’ health with tobacco industry interests creates an 
interagency arrangement that perpetuates a tenuous and often 
crippling context from a health policy perspective. This emphasis on 
‘balance’ appears to be more of an attempt to insert and protect 
industry interests in a health measure that should necessarily restrict 
their commercial activity. Tobacco control is logically oriented to 
regulate industry activity, not to balance its interests with health 
objectives. The fact that this emphasis on balance is explicit in RA 
9211 legitimizes the orientation of the IAC-T towards protecting the 
tobacco industry from harm and again the reinforcing nature of the Act 
and the IAC-T is visible. To restate, the text of RA 9211 decenters 
health objectives while at the same time foregrounding industry 
interests. This text is then used as justification for the inclusion of the 
tobacco industry on the IAC-T, the leadership of the IAC-T being 
situated with DTI and the overt agenda of the IAC-T to protect the 
economic viability of the industry.  
Despite these overt challenges, we found other subtle 
challenges that arise in the different ‘theories’ held by different key 
actors about the roles of government sectors and their responsibilities 
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to society. The difference in perspectives is a common challenge of WG 
to health policy, particularly if the objective is policy coherence. For 
example, it was a common sentiment by all key informants that each 
department was guided by different rules both domestically and 
internationally. DTI noted that they are guided by the rules of the 
World Trade Organization and free trade agreements. DTI, the 
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the National Tobacco 
Administration (NTA) indicated that they are responsible to protect the 
interests of both industry and tobacco growers. DTI pointed out that 
the tobacco industry is a legal entity and therefore one of its legitimate 
constituents. They noted that they have a difficult time reconciling 
their responsibilities as the chair of the committee while being 
responsive to a major industry. They suggest that they understand the 
spirit of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which is meant to protect tobacco 
control policies from tobacco industry interference, but point out that it 
directly contradicts their official mandate.  
It is not surprising that both the DOH and tobacco control non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) found this responsibility in conflict 
with their own mandates to protect Philippine citizens from the harms 
of tobacco consumption and to implement the provisions of the FCTC. 
Many of the tobacco control advocates from civil society noted that 
they refused to meet with the IAC-T when the industry representative 
was present. Key informants from the DOH expressed that they were 
frustrated with the IAC-T arrangements, and have even refused to 
attend some meetings on suspicion that the industry representative 
uses information from the IAC-T meetings to counter the DOH. A 
participant from DTI noted that they found it ‘strange that NGO health 
advocates have this policy of not sitting at the table with cigarette 
companies, but because we are a trade department, it is natural for us 
to consult all stakeholders … One of the stakeholders is the industry’.  
The different theories of multisectoral governance held by the 
different sectors of government are best characterized as (1) public 
health should take precedence over private interests, (2) private 
interests should take precedence over public health, and (3) there 
should be a balance between public health and private interests 
objectives. RA 9211 clearly rejects the first theory by legislating the 
inclusion of industry representation on the IAC-T, providing the chair 
position to DTI, and making a commitment to balance industry 
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interests and health objectives. This same conflict of theories is likely 
to occur when WG are applied to food and alcohol governance. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the food industry has made efforts to 
present their products as risk-neutral or even free of risk in relation to 
NCDs. This framing is clearly meant to protect the viability of their 
business amidst threats from those who seek to regulate and thus 
mitigate the consumption of such products on health grounds. It is 
important to note that economics and health are not inherently in 
opposition; in fact, one can facilitate the other, and thus policy 
coherence is a reasonable objective of WG. It is clear that many of the 
social determinants of health are rooted in economic prosperity, such 
as employment or public services that receive their funding in part 
from the revenue generated from the private sector.  
It is crucial to disentangle the concept of private interests from 
economic policy. These two are often conflated, creating a situation 
where a dichotomy between economics and health is easily 
perpetuated. It is possible, for example, for the DTI to discourage 
tobacco production while supporting economic development in other 
industries. In other words, economic development does not necessarily 
require the uniform support of all private commercial activity, 
specifically when such activity poses a threat to broader public welfare 
(the principal rationale used to support public regulations). This 
distinction is fundamental when confronting the argument that the 
commercial activity of tobacco, food or alcohol companies must be 
balanced with health objectives. The protection and promotion of 
industry interests by the DTI and other departments is not a necessary 
consequence of having a WG to tobacco control. Rather the idea of 
‘balance’ supported by the DTI and other departments perpetuates an 
IAC-T structure that protects and promotes the tobacco industry to the 
direct detriment of public health. The separation of health and industry 
interests may serve as a precondition for successful interagency 
arrangements. In other words, tobacco legislation that brings together 
industry interests and health objectives in order to ‘balance’ the two, 
as RA 9211 does, leads to a space of competing objectives rather than 
a space that can foster coherence.  
The DOH has responded to the unfavourable composition of the 
IAC-T using two strategies: (1) attempting to denormalize industry 
representation and (2) creating new distinct forums where the DOH 
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can act autonomously from the IAC-T. The first strategy is represented 
by the action taken by the DOH to produce a Memorandum in 2010 on 
tobacco industry interference and means to protect against such 
interference (DOH 2010). This Memorandum provides guidelines for 
industry interactions and the denormalization of industry activities in 
line with the provisions of Article 5.3 of the FCTC. The DOH has had to 
navigate the presence of the industry on the IAC-T while attempting to 
limit their power as reflected in the following statement: ‘The 
Department of Health does NOT deal with the tobacco industry or 
individuals or entities that work to further the interests of the tobacco 
industry, except to the extent strictly necessary to effectively regulate, 
supervise, or control the tobacco industry and tobacco products’ 
(original emphasis) (DOH 2010).  
The DOH has attempted to create alternative forums to the IAC-
T in order to move towards FCTC commitments. In 2011, DOH led the 
drafting of the National Tobacco Control Strategy (NCTS) and the 
Tobacco Control Action Plan 2011–16. The NCTS ‘reflects the 
government’s political commitment for the complete implementation of 
the WHO-FCTC’ (National Tobacco Control Strategy (2011–16) 2010), 
apparently an initiative to move towards implementing the provisions 
of the FCTC and phase out the limitations of RA 9211. The DOH 
established a Sector-Wide Anti-Tobacco (SWAT) committee and 11 
sub-committees meant to address the provisions of the FCTC. Here the 
DTI is a member, and always attends meetings, but there is no 
industry representative. SWAT is an attempt at interagency relations, 
minus the tobacco industry, as envisioned in the FCTC. Although SWAT 
has fully rolled out committees with responsibilities, it does not have 
legal standing. In fact, proponents are seeking an Executive Order to 
mandate the SWAT Committee.  
In 2008, there was hope that the DOH had achieved some 
autonomy from the IAC-T proper when the IAC-T produced a 
memorandum establishing ‘Pilot Agencies’ (DTI 2008). The 
Memorandum divides responsibility between the DTI and the DOH. 
According to the Memorandum, the DTI is responsible for access 
restrictions including issues such as minimum age sales, proof of age 
verification and sale of tobacco products within school perimeters, 
among others, and the DOH is responsible for the administration of 
Healthful Environment (e.g. smoking ban in public places, etc.) and 
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Advertising and Promotions (e.g. package warnings, restrictions on 
advertising and promotions, etc.). The establishment of Pilot Agency 
authority appeared to strengthen the autonomy of the DOH to monitor 
and enforce key facets of the Philippines tobacco control strategy. 
However, the above-mentioned case between PMPMI and the DOH 
resulted in a judicial decision that denounced the autonomy of DOH 
from the IAC-T and ultimately ruled that the DOH does not have the 
delegated authority to administer RA 9211 outside of the IAC-T (Philip 
Morris Philippines Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, 
n.d.). PMPMI claimed that the carte blanche decision not to accept 
tobacco industry applications for promotional activities was unlawful 
given that the authority to implement RA 9211 was housed with the 
IAC-T. The Court of Appeals decided that ‘importantly, the DOH, by 
itself, is without any authority to enforce any provision of R.A. No. 
9211’, and went further to state that ‘without a doubt, the DOH 
arrogated to itself the authority given exclusively to the IAC-Tobacco 
to administer and implement the provisions of the Tobacco Regulation 
Act allegedly violated by petitioner’ (Philip Morris Philippines 
Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.). This judicial 
decision confirms again the finding that RA 9211 has served in a way 
to tie the hands of those seeking to implement FCTC-compliant 
measures and has located the authority for tobacco control in the IAC-
T. The DOH continues to attempt the second strategy of autonomous 
action; however, this case demonstrates the challenges DOH has had 
in establishing authority and autonomy to act outside of the purview of 
the IAC-T.  
Conclusion 
The IAC-T has clearly created challenges for those attempting to 
strengthen tobacco control in the Philippines. RA 9211 and the IAC-T 
have become negatively reinforcing from the perspective of tobacco 
control. In sum, what lessons can be drawn from the Philippine 
tobacco control case that can be applied to the future of WG to NCD 
prevention and control?  
In the future, WG to NCD prevention and control should exclude 
tobacco, food and alcohol industry representatives from mandated 
interagency arrangements. The principal rationale to support this 
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position is that horizontal collaboration between the regulator(s) and 
the regulated industry risks co-option by private interests (regulatory 
capture). This is not to say that the inclusion of industry 
representatives necessarily leads to capture, but such an arrangement 
logically increases the chance of this happening. We noted that 
generally private interests resist regulation and this is true of the 
tobacco, food and alcohol industries (Moodie et al. 2013). This industry 
penchant against regulation creates a difficult dynamic for those 
seeking industry regulation to achieve health objectives. Chaiton et al. 
(2006) argue that ‘the corporate nature of tobacco companies is a 
structural obstacle to reducing harm caused by tobacco use’, which 
could also arguably be applied to the production of prepackaged food 
and alcohol. Systemic exclusion of industry from mandated 
interagency arrangements would still allow appropriate government 
departments to interact with industry, but not as partners in a 
mandated institutional arrangement around the development of health 
policy. For example, interagency arrangements can host public 
consultations with industry stakeholders. Such interactions should still 
require standards of transparency and accountability by ensuring that 
such meetings are in the public record and meeting minutes are 
recorded. In sum, proponents of WG to NCD prevention and control 
should not be distracted by purported differences between the three 
industries but should establish a common standard that protects 
against the inclusion of private interests in formal government 
decision-making/enforcing structures. To reiterate, a mandated 
interagency arrangement is a public institution and the implications of 
relegating power to the members from the commercial sector must be 
considered in light of the policy goals guiding the function of the 
institution. The Philippine case highlights the problems that arise when 
a policy creates space for the policy preferences of private commercial 
interests to be weighed against health objectives.  
The Philippine case demonstrates that a policy of ‘balance’ can 
create a problematic situation for those seeking enhanced industry 
regulation towards health ends. The emphasis on ‘balance’ can be 
particularly problematic when other department objectives contradict 
health objectives (Gould 2005; Jarman et al. 2012; Gleeson and Friel 
2013; Drope and Lencucha 2014). Similar clashes in objectives are 
likely to emerge in the control of unhealthy foods or alcohol, and may 
be more complicated by the fact that the food industry has been 
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working to project itself as a legitimate partner in efforts to address 
obesity, diabetes and other NCDs (Ludwig and Nestle 2008; Brownell 
and Warner 2009). In the case of the Philippines, some department 
objectives were justified by a policy of ‘balance’. This so-called 
‘balance’ between industry interests and health objectives is explicitly 
written in the legislation and must be avoided in future legislation 
pertaining to product regulation and NCD prevention and control. The 
case of RA 9211 and the IAC-T demonstrates how policy precedes 
institutional arrangements and thus sets the direction of the function 
of these arrangements. The transferable lesson is that policy for NCD 
prevention and control must be clearly and explicitly oriented to health 
objectives. A genuinely balanced policy can be fostered at the macro-
level of whole-of-government, whereby a government pursues 
objectives of economic prosperity parallel to objectives of health and 
welfare. This type of balance is possible. Problems occur when a policy 
of balance is promoted at the micro-level of a particular health-
harming product, such as tobacco. For example, tobacco consumption 
is harmful and tobacco must be regulated for the public good and this 
regulation must take precedence over industry interests. In other 
words, the nature of tobacco is harmful to health and a policy of 
balance is untenable. This same logic can and should apply to the food 
and alcohol industry. The logic returns to the importance of 
disaggregating private commercial interests from public policy that 
fosters economic prosperity. A government is not obligated to regulate 
all commercial activity in the same way, particularly when that activity 
is a threat to public health.  
A more nuanced lesson is that health advocates must be 
sensitive to the institutional constraints imposed on economic agencies 
to represent all stakeholders. Given the tenuous environment of 
interagency relations it is necessary to approach this issue not with 
reproach but with understanding of the constraints imposed on the 
different economic agencies to consult with all stakeholders (Drope 
and Lencucha 2013). As noted above, such consultation must be open 
and transparent. Advocates of WG to NCD prevention and control must 
find creative strategies that protect consultations from industry 
interference while respecting the possibility that some agencies might 
be compelled to interact with the tobacco industry. This context 
supports the need to have leadership of mandated interagency 
arrangements situated in health departments. For example, health 
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agencies can operate independent of the (real or perceived) need to 
consult with the industry. This independence can support a more 
specifically health-focused orientation in interagency arrangements 
and can provide the authority to steer the group towards health goals. 
In addition to the issue of leadership, it may be necessary to create 
arrangements that include some sectors and exclude others. This may 
not represent the WG ideal in the true sense of all-inclusiveness, but 
rather establishes a selective group of members who are aligned on 
the foundational health objectives. This type of arrangement might be 
necessary in the case of intractable conflicts of perspective (i.e. 
theories of intersectoral governance) across sectors. For example, this 
might be needed in countries that are only beginning to address 
tobacco, food and alcohol control and have departments or agencies 
that are deeply enmeshed with commercial interests. In many ways, 
the Philippines experience with tobacco control is a cautionary tale for 
countries seeking to develop new policies and institutional 
arrangements for NCD prevention and control. With new global 
strategies at the WHO on harmful use of alcohol, diet and physical 
activity, it is plausible that governments will soon face these 
challenges in other areas of health if they do not already (Gould 2005; 
Gleeson and Friel 2013).  
Governments are far from monolithic and within each one there 
exist discrete agencies and actors with different and sometimes 
contradictory mandates. WG can offer a useful forum to create and 
implement policy for NCD prevention and control. There is a pressing 
need to interrogate how these arrangements are designed, who is 
included and what is the nature of the policy that is guiding the 
function of these arrangements. In fact, as we observe in this critical 
case, the chosen WG structure continues to shape the ultimate 
outcomes. In this scenario, the proponents of tobacco interests 
appeared to have gained a distinct advantage by enshrining an 
interagency arrangement that over-privileges private commercial 
interests over health concerns. Thus, the choices that governments 
make when structuring WG to NCD prevention and control are crucial. 
Intergovernmental organizations and governments must consider the 
implications and nuanced forms of WG when advocating for their 
establishment.  
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